CORRESPONDENCE ON FREE
EXERCISE REVISIONISM

In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism
William P. Marshallt

In Employment Division v Smith, the Supreme Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel courts to grant exemptions from generally applicable criminal laws to individuals
whose religious beliefs conflict with those laws.' Professor Michael
McConnell has powerfully attacked Smith in a recent article in the
Review. 2 In this essay, I defend Smith's rejection of the constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption against McConnell's
critique.
The Smith opinion itself, however, cannot be readily defended. The decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor wellt Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I would like to
thank Erwin Chemerinski, James Lindgren, Maureen Collins and Melvin Durshslag for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also indebted to Frank Calabrese and Susan
Belanger for their research assistance.
110 S Ct 1595, 1606 (1990). The Smith litigation involved two members of the Native
American Church who had been denied unemployment benefits after being fired for ingesting peyote, a drug used in the Church's sacraments. The Oregon Supreme Court held
that a religious practice could not be the basis for the denial of unemployment benefits. The
U.S. Supreme Court vacated the case and instructed the lower court on remand to determine whether peyote use was legal in the state, reasoning that if peyote use could be criminally punished, it could be a basis for the lesser penalty of denial of employment benefits.
Employment Division v Smith (Smith 1), 485 US 660 (1988). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that although the state did not currently enforce its drug law against
sacramental peyote use, the law did not contain an exception for such use. When the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the case for the second time, it held that enforcement of generally applicable drug laws against peyote users would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
For the two opinions by the Oregon Supreme Court, see 301 Or 209, 721 P2d 445 (1986); 307
Or 68, 763 P2d 146 (1988).
2 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi
L Rev 1109 (1990).
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crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise
jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction. 3 The
opinion is also a paradigmatic example of judicial overreaching.
The holding extends beyond the facts of the case, the lower court's
decision on the issue, and even the briefs of the parties. In fact, it
appears that the Court framed the free exercise issue in virtually
the broadest terms possible in order to allow it to reach its
4
landmark result.
Smith, therefore, may ultimately serve better as fodder for the
arguments of those who, like McConnell, oppose its result 5 than as
support for those who, like myself, agree with the opinion's central
contention.6 My task is then to defend Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending'
Smith itself. In so doing, I concentrate on the two critical theoretical concerns that separate McConnell and myself: (1) the cogency
of exemption analysis; and (2) the role of equality in free exercise
theory.7 Both concerns lead to a rejection of the free exercise exemption claim.

' The Court's claim that Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972), was decided on the
basis of a "hybrid" constitutional right, see Smith, 110 S Ct at 1601, is particularly illustrative of poetic license. See James D. Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountain Top, 79 Cal L
Rev - (forthcoming 1991).
1 Perhaps most disturbing about Smith is the harshness of its result relative to the
religious tradition involved in the case itself. In this regard, it is useful to compare, for
example, the concern for the Amish expressed in Yoder, 406 US 205. As in Yoder, the interest of the Native Americans in Smith may be more one of maintaining a community identity than a religious practice. Compare Ronald R. Garet, Community and Existence: The
Rights of Groups, 56 S Cal L Rev 1001, 1034 (1983).
1 See Gordon, 79 Cal L Rev - (cited in note 3); Douglas C. Laycock, The Remnants of
Free Exercise, 1990 S Ct Rev - (forthcoming).
6 See Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 Notre
Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 591 (1990); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 S Ct Rev 373; Philip B. Kurland, Religion and
The Law 17-18 (Aldine Publishing, 1962).
Although Professor McConnell relies in part on text, history, and precedent in his
attack on Smith, see McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1114-28 (cited in note 2), he acknowledges that the flaws in Smith's use of text, history, and precedent "might have been overcome (or at least mitigated) by writing the opinion in a different way." Id at 1111. They are,
therefore, of "lesser interest" than the theoretical dispute. Id. For a brief treatment of my
views as to the text and history arguments as they pertain to whether the First Amendment
distinguished between religious and non-religious belief, see text at notes 94-95. For a more
general account of my views on text and history, see William P. Marshall, The Case Against
the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W Res L Rev 357, 37379 (1989-90). Essentially I argue that the text of the free exercise clause is more properly
read as protecting religion against laws that single it out for adverse treatment than as providing religion with special benefits. I also contend that history is at best ambiguous on the
exemption issue although numerous factors suggest that the notion of constitutionally compelled exemptions would not have been within the framers' contemplation. It may be that
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THE TROUBLE WITH EXEMPTIONS

A. The Inherent Difficulties
Professor McConnell is correct when he asserts that merely
because a judicial task necessary to enforce a constitutional provision is difficult does not mean it should be abandoned.8 However, a
particular analysis should be rejected when it undermines the constitutional values it purports to protect, is inherently arbitrary,
forces courts to engage in a balancing process that systematically
underestimates the state interest, and threatens other constitutional values. Such is the case with free exercise exemption
analysis.9

First, exemption analysis threatens free exercise values because it requires courts to consider the legitimacy of the religious
claim of the party seeking the exemption. Under the exemption
analysis, the court must first determine, at a definitional level,
whether the belief at issue is "religious." Then it must determine
whether the belief is sincerely held. As has been well-documented,
both inquiries are not only awkward and counterproductive; they
also threaten the values of religious freedom. 10 Moreover, the judicial definition of religion does more than simply limit religion; it
places an official imprimatur on certain types of belief systems to
my own moderate historical response to McConnell is understated. Some suggest that the
historical data more directly refutes the contention that the framers envisioned the creation
of exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause. See West, 4 Notre Dame J Law, Ethics &
Pub Pol at 623-33 (cited in note 6); Philip Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight to Religious
Exemptions: An Historical Perspective (forthcoming).
' McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1143-44 (cited in note 2). But see Garcia v San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 545-49 (1985).
1 At this point some care should be taken to distinguish a true commitment to exemption analysis like that advocated by McConnell and the less-than-nominal adherence to exemption analysis applied by the Court in its pre-Smith decisions. As the Smith Court notes
and as McConnell and I both agree, the pre-Smith Court did not apply exemption analysis
seriously. See also Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU
L Rev 299. The pre-Smith Court granted exemptions only in two circumstances: Amish
exclusion from compulsory education requirements, see Yoder, 406 US 205, and religious
applicant exclusion from unemployment compensation requirements, see, for example,
Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963) (first of four cases granting an exemption from unemployment compensation laws).
" Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 Harv L Rev 933, 953-60 (1989); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 Stan L Rev 233, 241 (1989) ("to define
religion is to limit it"); Marshall, 40 Case W Res L Rev at 386-88 (cited in note 7); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 Wm &
Mary L Rev 985, 988 (1986).
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the exclusion of others. At the very least, as Justice Stevens has
argued, this power of approval or disapproval raises Establishment
Clause problems. 1
McConnell seems delightfully unconcerned by this. "To be
sure, the court may get it wrong, but what is the grave injury from
that (other than the impact on the case itself)?' 2 This is indeed a
strange response from someone who, as we shall see, bases much of
his argument in favor of exemption on the need to protect religious
minorities. Minority belief systems-not majority belief systems-will bear the brunt of the definition and the sincerity inquiries.'" A court is more likely to find against a claimant on definitional grounds when the religion is bizarre, relative to the
cultural norm, and is more likely to find that a religious belief is
insincere when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, incredulous.' 4 The religious claims most likely to be recognized, therefore, are those that closely parallel .or directly relate to the culture's predominant religious traditions. 5 To put it in concrete
terms, Mrs. Sherbert's claim that she is forbidden to work on Saturdays is likely to be accepted as legitimate; 16 Mr. Hodges's claim
that he must dress like a chicken when going to court is not.
Second, the exemption analysis requires courts to engage in a
highly problematic form of constitutional balancing. In other doctrinal areas, the Court balances the state interest in the regulation
at issue against the interests of the regulated class taken as a
whole."8 Exemption analysis, however, requires a court to weigh
the state interest against the interest of the narrower class comprised only of those seeking exemption. This leads to both unpre1'See United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 n 2 (1982) (Stevens concurring).
12 McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 2).

"sIn his response, McConnell argues that similar problems also occur in establishment
analysis. Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev 329,
330 (1991). He is incorrect. Establishment inquiry entirely avoids the sincerity issue. Moreover, any definitional decision holding a minority belief not to be religious in the establishment context works in part to the minority beliefs favor, because such a decision allows
government support.
14 See, for example, Tushnet, 1989 S Ct Rev at 382-83 (cited in note 6).
" Id at 383.
16 See Sherbert, 374 US at 410 (free exercise rights of Seventh Day Adventist violated
when state refused to give her unemployment compensation after she was fired for refusing
to work on Saturdays).
17 See State v Hodges, 695 SW2d 171 (Tenn 1985) (before holding defendant in contempt of court, trial court should have inquired into defendant's claim that dressing "like a
chicken" when in court was his spiritual attire and his religious belief).
1s Geoffrey R. Stone and William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality
as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 S Ct Rev 583, 598.
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dictability in the process and potential inconsistency in result as
each regulation may be subject to limitless challenges based upon
the peculiar identity of the challenger. 19
Third, the exemption balancing process necessarily leads to0
2
underestimating the strength of the countervailing state interest.
The state interest in a challenged regulation will seldom be seriously threatened if only a few persons seek exemption from it. A
legitimate state interest is often "compelling" only in relation to
cumulative concerns. 2 If; for example, one factory is exempt from
anti-pollution requirements, the state's interest in protecting air
quality will not be seriously disturbed. When many factories pollute, on the other hand, the state interest is seriously threatened.
Weighing the state interest against a narrow class seeking exemption is similar to asking whether this particular straw is the one
that breaks the camel's back.
Finally, in some circumstances, free exercise exemption analysis may result in a troublesome interplay with the Speech Clause
that threatens both speech and free exercise interests. Many activities that raise only speech concerns when undertaken by a secular
group-literature distribution, for example-will raise both speech
and free exercise 'concerns when undertaken by a religious group.
The problem is that allowing only free exercise exemptions from
governmental restrictions on those activities would mean that only
religious groups could engage in the expressive activity. Such a result offends the central Speech Clause principle of content neutral-

'9

Id.

McConnell's exemption analysis ignores the importance of the state regulatory interests as well. His test instructs courts to grant exemptions to all religious claims that do "not
trespass on private rights or the public peace," McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1145 (cited in
note 2) (quoting Gaillard Hunt, ed, 9 The Writings of James Madison 100 (G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1910)). Under McConnell's test, government can only intervene to prevent a person
from harming his neighbors.
By using this narrow definition, McConnell ensures that the free exercise interest will
prevail in almost every instance because the state interest in preventing a person from
harming his neighbors will apparently be recognized only in limited circumstances.
In this regard, McConnell's conclusion that exemptions should have been granted in
Alamo Foundationv Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290 (1985) (discussed in McConnell, 57 U
Chi L Rev at 1145), and Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574 (1983) (discussed in McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1146), is notable as the regulation at issue in Alamo
was designed to prevent worker exploitation while the regulation at issue in Bob Jones was
aimed at racial discrimination.
21 Prohibitions against murder and theft are examples where the state interest is fully
implicated by one offense.
20
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ity; it creates, in effect, a content-based distinction in favor of reli2
gious expression. 1
On the other hand, not granting free exercise exemptions in
cases where speech activity is implicated in order to avoid the content neutrality problem23 is also troublesome in that it leads to a
pattern of results that only remotely effectuates free exercise values. Because much of the core of religious exercise-prayer,
proselytization, and preaching, for example-is expressive conduct
covered by the Free Speech2 4 Clause, disqualifying expressive religious claims from exemption eligibility excludes the most fundamental aspects of religious exercise from free exercise consideration. The free exercise exemption would then primarily serve to
protect activities at the periphery of religious exercise. Needless to
say, there is a certain disutility in a doctrine that ultimately protects activities of marginal importance to the exclusion of those of
central concern.2 5
B.

McConnell's Categorical Response

McConnell is not blind to the difficulties inherent in exemption analysis. He recognizes that the balancing test prior to Smith
was plagued by "arbitrariness" and was "unacceptably subjective. '26 He asserts, however, that while these problems cannot be
entirely avoided, they can be substantially reduced. He then goes
on to suggest that in at least three categories of cases exemption
claims may be readily decided without forcing the courts to engage
in "case-specific" balancing.2 7 These categories are (1) cases
"where the putative injury [addressed by the challenged enactment] is internal to the religious community"; 28 (2) cases in which
the exemption would make religious believers "better off relative
to others than they would be in the absence of the government
program to which they object";2" and (3) claims in which minority
religions seek the "same consideration under the Free Exercise
22 See Heifron v Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 US 640, 652-53 (1981).

The question of whether the Constitution prefers religious belief in a manner that
would allow free exercise interests to trump content-neutrality requirements is addressed in
Section II.C.
24 See, for example, Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 269 (1981)
23 Smith itself, however, does not support the point however as it presents an example
where a central religious practice was not expressive.
28 McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 2).
27 Id at 1145.
2 Id. McConnell does allow a narrow exception from this rule in the case of injury to

children.
29 Id at 1146.
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Clause that mainstream religions receive in the political process. '30
McConnell would, without balancing, immediately grant exemptions in cases that fall .within the first and third categories, and
deny them in cases within the second.
This categorical approach, however, does not succeed even as a
limited response to the problems raised in exemption analysis. Indeed, it may exacerbate some of the difficulties. This is most apparent with respect to McConnell's first category-cases where the
injury sought to be prevented by the state is internal to the religious community. As an example of this type of case, McConnell
cites Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor.3 1 In Alamo, the
Court unanimously rejected a free exercise challenge to wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act as applied to commercial enterprises run by a religious organization ostensibly in furtherance of the organization's religious mission.3 2 The Alamo Foundation employed a number of its members
("associates") in its enterprises and provided them with- food,
33
clothing, shelter, and other benefits rather than cash salaries.
This arrangement was apparently acceptable to the Foundation's
employees because the receipt of wages allegedly conflicted with
34
the religious beliefs of the Alamo religion.
McConnell argues that a free exercise exemption from the
FLSA should have been granted: "if members of the Alamo religious movement are inspired to work for the glory of God for long
hours at no pay, their neighbors are not injured and the government has no legitimate power to intervene. ' ' 5
The problem of course is that Alamo's neighbors are injured.
The Foundation's business competitors are unfairly disadvantaged
by the Foundation's reduced labor coits3 6 Non-Foundation employees may be harmed by the resulting "downward pressure on
wages in competing industries. ' 37 Indeed, the whole neighborhood
may be harmed if the Foundation's employees need to seek state
3oId

at 1147.
-- 471 US 290 (1985), discussed in McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1145-46 (cited in note

2).
P. Alamo, 471 US at 306. The Foundation's businesses included service stations, retail
clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing and electrical construction companies, a
recordkeeping company, a motel, and candy production and distribution companies. Id at
292.
" Id at 292.
34 Id at 303.
35 McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1145 (cited in note 2).
36 Alamo, 471 US at 299.
37 Id at 302.
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medical or welfare assistance because of their own lack of financial
resources. Even the conclusion that any harm to the Foundation's
own employees is not a matter of legitimate state concern is questionable. The state has a strong interest in assuring that the superior bargaining power of employers does not coerce employees to
agree "voluntarily" to substandard wages.38 There is no reason to
believe that this interest is in any way diminished when the employer is a religious organization."9 McConnell's conception of "internal," in short, evokes an economic and social insularity that is
not realistic.40 In a complex and interdependent society, few cases,
if any, are likely to implicate matters that are the sole concern of
41
the religious community.
McConnell's second category would reject exemption claims
that would make the religious believer better off than others, in
the absence of the challenged regulatory enactment. His application of this principle, however, seems too limited to be meaningful.
Again, the Alamo case is illustrative. Because exemption would allow it to pay lower wages than its competitors, the Alamo foundation is clearly better off relative to its business competitors after
exemption than it would be had the FLSA never been enacted.
One would then think that Alamo presents the archetypal secondcategory case where exemption should be denied. McConnell, however, supports the Alamo Foundation's claim for exemption.4 2
More broadly, although not necessarily better off relative to
others in the absence of any regulation at all, exemptions will always make those exempted "better off" relative to others. Granting
only religious objectors exemptions from neutral laws necessarily
makes them better off than non-religious objectors whose claims
will be denied. The Amish in Wisconsin v Yoder 43 are better off

Id.
3' Rather, the combined religious and economic authority that a religious organization
may have over one of its member-employees suggests that, if anything, its power to coerce is
increased.
40 McConnell's conception resembles the Court's early (and narrow) interpretation of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. Compare RailroadRetirement Board v Alton R.R. Co.,
295 US 330, 357, 360 (1935), and Hammer v Dagenhart,247 US 251, 273 (1918), with Heart
of Atlanta Motel v United States, 379 US 241, 258 (1964), and United States v Darby, 312
US 100, 122-23 (1941).
41 Even McConnell acknowledges, for example, that Bob Jones University's practice of
racial discrimination may have effects outside the school's own campus. McConnell, 57 U
Chi L Rev at 1146 (cited in note 2).
4 To be fair, McConnell does not discuss Alamo in the context of his second category.
Nevertheless, he clearly feels that the exemption in Alamo was wrongly denied. Id at 1145 n
160.
41 406 US 205 (1972).
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having couched their objection to compulsory education in religious terms than a group of Thoreauians whose objection would be
based on social or political grounds. Indeed, as shall be discussed,
the essential problem with religious-only exemptions is that they
necessarily create this form of disparity. If properly applied, McConnell's second category would eliminate the free exercise
44
exemption.
McConnell's third category allows exemptions in cases where
minority religions seek the same consideration that majority religions have already received through the political process. McConnell even provides a helpful test to determine the cases that fit this
category: Is the government interest so important that it would in45
terfere with majority religious practice in order to effectuate it?
The application of this test, according to McConnell, would make
many cases easy:
Who can doubt that unobtrusive exceptions to military uniform regulations would be made if Christians, like Orthodox
Jews, had to wear yarmulkes at all times? Who can doubt that
there would be exceptions to social security (or, more likely,
no social security at all) if mainstream Christians were forbidden by their religion to participate? . . . Other cases would
come out the other way. A country could probably not survive
if it allowed selective conscientious objection to war. Nor
would it allow trespass or interference with the private rights
of others. A government interest is sufficient if it is so important that it is not conceivable that the government would
waive it even if the religious needs of the majority so
required.46
The central problem with this test, however, is that it is virtually
useless as an analytical tool because it fails to differentiate between valid and invalid claims. Quite simply, if this test were honestly applied, it is doubtful that any cases "would come out the
other way." A society is never likely to find a strong regulatory
interest in a measure that is hostile to the majoritarian tradition,
and accordingly is unlikely to pass such a measure in the first
place. Of course, at one level 'this conclusion reinforces McCon44 McConnell does not clearly define the parameters of his second category. He suggests
that it would apply in cases in which the exemption would create an "incentive" for religious practice, but the term "incentive" is not developed. McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at
1145-46 (cited in note 2).
45 Id at 1147.
40 Id at 1148 (citations omitted).
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nell's thesis, discussed below, that majority religions will seldom
burden themselves and that minority religions therefore require
special protection. At a more fundamental level, however, it reflects an understanding of the interplay between religious tradition, culture, and law which demonstrates the critical weakness of
McConnell's argument.
Specifically, McConnell ignores that the measure of the importance of a state interest underlying a government prohibition is a
function of the mores of the society, and those mores, in turn, are
often a function of that society's religious values and traditions.
The conclusion that polygamy should be proscribed, for example,
is premised upon a cultural tradition intimately tied to this nation's religious beliefs and traditions. Thus, although polygamy
would certainly not be prohibited if it were part of majority Christian practice, the "if" in this statement presupposes a social structure different from the existing one. A society in which polygamy is
a majority religious practice is not the society in which we live.
McConnell's test measures the regulatory interests of a culture
that does not exist rather than the one that does.
McConnell's failure to recognize the role of religious tradition
in the creation of social norms is equally apparent in his assertion
that the state will protect against "trespass or interference with
the private rights of others 47 even if those protections conflict
with the religious majority. Even assuming this statement to be
true, "trespass," "interference," and "private rights" are all terms
that must be interpreted according to the mores of the society-mores influenced by the society's religious values and traditions. Again, the religious background of society will influence the
nature of the state interest. One cannot assume the existence of a
religiously neutral society from which to measure the importance
of state interests.
II.

EXEMPTIONS AND THE

Two FACES OF EQUALITY

McConnell and I also disagree on the role that equality must
play in the free exercise context. McConnell relies on a concern of
denominational equality in his support of the free exercise exemption. I, in contrast, rely on a concern for belief system equality in
arguing that the free exercise exemption should be rejected.

47

Id.
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A. Denominational Equality
McConnell's most sympathetic argument is that the denial of
exemptions would have a disproportionate impact on minority
groups. He is correct in noting that neutral restrictions have disproportionate impacts. This phenomenon, of course, is not unique
to religion. One seeking to protest against a government policy by
camping out in Lafayette Park is more adversely affected by a
government regulation prohibiting that activity than is one who
seeks to protest in another manner. Normally, however, concerns
of disproportionate impact do not support constitutional claims
49
unless there is also an improper intent.
Nevertheless, facially neutral laws are arguably more problematic in the free exercise context than in other contexts. As just
noted, cultural traditions and social mores generally reflect
majoritarian religious beliefs. Legislators are more likely to be
aware of majoritarian religious practices (their own) when they
fashion general regulations, and thus are unlikely to place disabilities on those practices. Similarly, they are less likely to be concerned with religious practices outside their religious tradition and
accordingly are more likely to place burdens on those practices inadvertently.5 0 McConnell thus plausibly argues that concerns of
denominational neutrality might support allowing exemptions in
those cases where the challenged regulation results in de facto ine5
quality for a minority religious practice1.
On the other hand, the free exercise exemption "cure" is arguably worse than the "disease"-i.e., the harm to religious exercise created by neutral laws. After all, even without the free exercise exemption, the constitutional protection for religion is
extensive and stringent. The Free Exercise Clause itself prohibits
any direct attempt to single out religion for adverse treatment,52
and the Free Speech Clause includes the protection of prayer,
proselytizing, preaching, and aspects of religious conscience in its
ambit.5 3 Moreover, the incidental de facto inequality created by
48 Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288 (1984).

" See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239-40 (1976).
10 See Pepper, 1986 BYU L Rev at 314 (cited in note 9); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L Rev 993, 1015-16
(1990).
81 But see text at note 54.
6 McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618, 629 (1978). In McDaniel, the Court declared unconstitutional a statute that barred "[m]inister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination
whatever," id at 621 n 1, from seeking office in the state house of representatives.
11 See, for example, Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 269 (1981).
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neutral laws is just that-incidental. It occurs only randomly and
haphazardly. Some minority religious beliefs will be aligned with
majority beliefs, while other minority beliefs will not. The Amish,
unlike Jews, are not disadvantaged by Sunday closing laws.54 In
other circumstances this pattern will be reversed. Jews, unlike the
Amish, are not disadvantaged by social security laws.5 5 One need
not fully accept Professor Mark Tushnet's claim that in a complex
society "the overall distribution of burdens and benefits is likely to
be reasonably fair" 56 to acknowledge that minority religions will be
on both sides of neutral laws.
Yet, one could argue that even if the harms to minority religion created by neutral laws are not pervasive or systemic, the concerns of denominational equality are so fundamental that they
should still be redressed. This argument, however, ignores the
harms that the free exercise exemption creates. As noted in Section I, exemption analysis is unduly problematic and counterproductive even to free exercise concerns. 57 Those reasons alone
support its abandonment.
B.

Equality of Belief

The free exercise exemption, however, raises another serious
concern. Granting exemptions only to religious claimants promotes
its own form of inequality: a constitutional preference for religious
over non-religious belief systems.
Case law readily illustrates this problem. In Wisconsin v
Yoder, the Court explicitly stated that constitutional exemption
from compulsory education requirements was available only to the
Amish on religious grounds and would not be available to a nonreligious group seeking exemption because of adherence to, for example, the philosophical precepts of Henry David Thoreau.5 8 Similarly, in Thomas v Review Board, the Court held that exemption
from unemployment insurance requirements would be available to
an individual whose religious tenets prevent him from working in
an armaments factory, but would not be available to one whose
claim was based upon "personal philosophical choice. ' ' 59
s, See Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599, 603 (1961).
'5 See United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 257 (1982).
"
Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante),
76 Georgetown L J 1691, 1700 (1988).
57 See text at notes 9-15.
'8 406 US 205, 216 (1972).
450 US 707, 713 (1981). Thomas also illustrates a problem noted earlier: How can a
factfinder distinguish between those beliefs that are religious and those that are philosophi-
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This favoritism for religious belief over other beliefs itself
raises serious constitutional concerns. Most obviously, a constitutional preference for religious belief cuts at the heart of the central
principle of the Free Speech Clause-that every idea is of equal
dignity and status in the marketplace of ideas.6
The free exercise exemption also offends Establishment Clause
principles. Special treatment for religion connotes sponsorship and
endorsement; 61 providing relative benefits for religion over non-religion may have the impermissible effect of advancing religion.2 In
fact, the type of discrimination created by the free exercise exemption is arguably worse-than the de facto inequality purportedly redressed by the exemption analysis because it is intentional, a matter of critical concern in equal protection analysis.6 3 The explicit
assertion in the free exercise claim that religious belief is uniquely
entitled to constitutional protection 64 is also troublesome from another equal protection vantage. As the Court has noted, explicit
endorsement of inequality is particularly egregious because it
sends a clear message of second-class status." Thus, the explicit
inequality required by the free exercise exemption analysis more
directly and powerfully harms equality interests than does the inadvertent de facto discrimination caused by generally applicable

laws.
Importantly, religious belief cannot be qualitatively distinguished from other belief systems in a way that justifies special
constitutional consideration. For example, bonds of ethnicity, 66 in-

terpersonal relationships,6 7 and social and political relationships 8
as well as religion may be, and are, integral to an individual's selfcal, moral or social? In Thomas the United States and Indiana Supreme Courts disagreed as
to how to characterize Thomas's objection, the former finding it to be religious and the
latter holding it to be philosphical. Id at 714-15.
60 See, for example, Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U Chi L Rev 20, 25 (1975).
61 See, for example, King's Garden, Inc. v FCC, 498 F2d 51, 55 (DC Cir 1974).
62 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 489 US 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion).
"' Washington v Davis, 426 US at 239-40.
" McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1152 (cited in note 2).
65

See, for example, Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483, 494 (1954).

66 William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw U L Rev

68, 86 (1986).
67 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L J 624, 635-37
(1980); Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984).
'8 Robert A. Nisbet, The Quest for Community 70-73 (Oxford, 1968); Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 Mich L Rev 1878,
1882 (1984).
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identity. 9 Similarly, both non-religious and religious groups further the values of pluralism by fostering diversity within society
and forming "intermediate communities" that shield the individual from the state. °
McConnell argues that religious belief is uniquely entitled to
exemption because it involves a duty to God-a transcendent sovereign.7 1 This contention, however, is neither persuasive nor fully
accurate. First, 'to the extent that it depends on a notion that special suffering attaches to violations of extra-temporal obligations,
the argument is extraordinarily overbroad. The violation of deeply
held moral or political principles may cause as much psychic harm
to the believer as would a violation of a religious tenet, even if the
latter is believed to have extra-temporal effect. 2
Second, not all religions are theistic-Buddhism and Taoism
are but two examples.7 1 Moreover, even with respect to theistic religions, some religious exercise is based upon religious custom
rather than divine obligation. 4 Belief in an external sovereign,
therefore, does not distinguish religious belief from all other forms
of belief. McConnell then may not rely upon any purported special
significance of extra-temporal belief as justifying special treatment
for religious exercise because not all religious exercise is premised
upon extra-temporal obligation.7
Perhaps the most significant evidence of the constitutional
equivalency between religious and non-religious belief systems,
however, is the critical role they share in the social and political
process. Religion is not insular. It is a powerful social and political
force that competes with other forms of belief in the shaping of the

e' Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and CulturalIdentity, 64
NC L Rev 303, 307 (1986). But see Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw U L Rev 1115, 1166 n 208 (1988). Even Conkle, however,
ultimately does not defend the religious/non-religious distinction.
"' Garet, 56 S Cal L Rev at 1034-35 (cited in note 4); Marshall, 40 Case W Res L Rev at
380-82 (cited in note 7).
71 McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1151-52 (cited in note 2).
712See John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 Conn L
Rev 779, 793 (1986); David A. J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 96-97 (Oxford,
1986).
73 See Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488, 495 n 11 (1961).
74 Dietary laws, for example, may be products of religious custom rather than divine
obligation.
75 It could be argued that only theistic claims should be entitled to free exercise exemption because of the allegedly special significance attached to extra-temporal obligation. This
position, however, would run afoul of the concern for denominational neutrality lying at the
heart of the exemption argument. The Court itself has suggested that theistic and nontheisteic religious beliefs are constitutionally equivalent. See Torcaso, 367 US at 495.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[58:308

mores and values of the society which, in turn, become part of the
society's political landscape. Thomas's claim that it is wrong to engage in armaments work or Bob Jones University's claim that racial discrimination is divinely based are morally and politically
laden and, if accepted by enough persons, would dramatically influence social and political reactions to those issues. Religious
views on the sanctity of life form a part of the social and moral
background from which political issues as diverse as capital punishment, abortion, animal rights, the environment, and foreign policy will be resolved. 6
The recognition of religion's influential role in the social and
political process also demonstrates that the fundamental inequality created by the free exercise exemption extends beyond the individual unfairness illustrated by cases such as Thomas, where religious pacifists win while moral or philosophical pacifists lose.
Exempting religious beliefs and organizations from neutral laws
enhances religion's ability to influence social norms and the political process. If the religious exemption works to insulate religious
beliefs from social forces, as McConnell urges it should,"7 those beliefs will enjoy a false vitality in the political arena relative to competing secular beliefs that must stand or fall on their own accord.
If religious organizations are exempted from regulatory requirements such as the FLSA, social security, or sales tax obligations,75
for example, they will have more resources available to carry on
their religious enterprise, proselytize, and disseminate ideas. Furthermore, judicial vindication through the free exercise exemption
is its own reward. A Supreme Court decision granting exemption in
Bob Jones, for example, would have bestowed a credibility and legitimacy upon the religious belief in question simply by its being

16Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics,and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 77, 156-60 (Oxford, 1988); Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 1011, 1060 (198586). Significantly, it is partly because of religion's influence in the political process that
McConnell asserts that minority religions need exemption from secular law. "In a world in
which some beliefs are more prominent than others, the political branches will inevitably be
selectively sensitive to religious injuries." McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1136 (cited in note
2).
" McConnell suggests that the essence of the free exercise clause is "counter-assimilationist." Id at 1139.
18Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290 (1985) (FLSA); United States v
Lee, 455 US 252 (1982) (social security); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization of Cal., 110 S Ct 688 (1990) (sales tax).
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judicially recognized as constitutionally sacrosanct. Other forms of
belief will not acquire this special judicial reinforcement.7 9
C.

McConnell's Response

At this point, McConnell has two responses. First, he argues
that the anti-exemption position is inconsistent, and second that
the Constitution prefers religious belief, functional equivalency
aside.
McConnell's assertion that the anti-exemption position is inconsistent is based on Smith's endorsement of statutory religious
exemptions.8 0 As McConnell argues, "[i]f there is nothing wrong
with statutory commands of the sovereign that make exceptions
from generally applicable laws in cases of conflict with religious
conscience, then there should be nothing wrong with constitutional
commands of the same sort."'"
While Smith's apparent wholesale endorsement of statutory
exemptions helps McConnell with this argument, a more careful
assertion that statutory religious exemptions may be permissible in
some circumstances does not cede as much as McConnell suggests.
To begin with, statutory exemptions present a different inquiry
than do constitutional exemptions. Statutory exemptions raise the
Establishment Clause issue of what the Constitution allows; the
free exercise exemption asks what the Constitution requires. A
conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause does not require a particular result does not mean that the Establishment Clause necessarily prohibits that result. As McConnell himself has argued, there
should be some space for permissible legislative action between the
two constitutional commands. 2
Furthermore, the nature of the establishment inquiry differs
from its free exercise counterpart. Establishment inquiry considers
the extent to which a government action may be interpreted as the
endorsement of religion."3 Limited statutory exemptions, however,
do not necessarily send this forbidden message.
Finally, McConnell's analogy between the constitutionally
compelled free exercise exemptions and statutory exemptions fails
7, A holding under the Free Speech Clause that racist speech is protected does not have
this same legitimizing effect because, unlike the free exercise claim, the protection of racist
speech does not require the court to find that the idea in question stems from a divine
belief.
Smith, 110 S Ct at 1606.
81 McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1150 (cited in note 2).
8 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S Ct Rev 1, 3.
83 See, for example, County of Allegheny v ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S
Ct 3086, 3100 (1989).
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on its own terms. Unlike constitutional exemptions, statutory exemptions are not presumptively valid. Those that benefit only religious institutions face stringent constitutional review on such
grounds as establishment,"4 free speech, 5 and equal protection. 6
The claim for the free exercise exemption, on the other hand, creates a presumption in favor of vindicating the free exercise interest-a presumption that offends the countervailing constitutional
8 1 In short, it is
concerns.
the rejection of the free exercise
claim-not its acceptance-that is most consistent with the constitutional treatment of statutory religious exemptions.18
McConnell's case thus must ultimately rest on the contention
that the Constitution prefers religious belief. He is prepared to
make this argument. In the last section of his article, he candidly
asserts that the free exercise exemption reflects a constitutional
recognition of the theological position "that God is sovereign" and
the commensurate political position "that government is a
subordinate association."8 9
Obviously, if the Free Exercise Clause endorses religious belief
in this manner, it would support the contention that the favoritism
of religiously-based belief systems over non-religiously-based sys84 See, for example, Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 489 US 1, 15 (1989) (state statutory
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violates the Establishment Clause); Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Amos, 483
US 327, 334-35 (1987) (applying Establishment Clause scrutiny to a religious exemption
from Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination in employment).
85 Texas Monthly, 489 US at 25-26 (White concurring) (statute that provides tax exemption for religious publications discriminates on basis of content of publication and
therefore violates Free Press Clause of First Amendment).
88 Milwaukee Montessori School v Percy, 473 F Supp 1358, 1359 (E D Wis 1979) (daycare licensing statute which created distinction between private parochial schools and other
private schools was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection).
87 Presumptive deference to statutory exemptions also exacerbates the concerns of improper favoritism for religiously-based belief systems over non-religiously-based systems
created by the free exercise exemption. Tushnet, 1989 S Ct Rev at 379-80 (cited in note 6).
88 The inconsistency that McConnell attacks would exist, if at all, only if the Court
were readily to defer to legislatively created religion-only exemptions while simultaneously
denying the free exercise claim. Justice Scalia, in particular, seems to be embarking on this
course. Compare Smith with Texas Monthly, 489 US at 29, 58 (Scalia dissenting). However,
there is nothing inherent in allowing statutory exemptions that is inconsistent with denying
the free exercise claim as long as religion-only statutory exemptions are subject to rigid
scrutiny.
88 McConnell relies heavily on Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in mAking this argument. McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1151-52 (cited
in note 2). Madison, however, cannot be too easily claimed as authority for this position. In
other writings, Madison is quite clear in his opposition to special exemption for religion. See
West, 4 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 627-30 (cited in note 6) and authorities cited
therein.
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tems is not constitutionally suspect (although it would perhaps
support special deference only to theistic religious claims).9 0 This
position, however, is more revisionist than Smith. At least since
1944, the Court has rejected the claim that the Constitution prefers one particular mode of belief. As the Court stated: "it may be
doubted that any of the great liberties in the First Article can be
given a higher place than the others."9 1
McConnell's proposed change in constitutional understanding
would require fundamental changes in other doctrinal areas. First,
it suggests that Establishment Clause norms have been too rigidly
enforced. If the recognition of allegiance to God is a preeminent
constitutional value, then government bodies should be able to
publicly acknowledge this fact without running afoul of the Constitution. 2 Similarly, if religious belief is supreme, the legality of direct aid to religions in the pursuit of their religious mission should
also be reexamined.93 McConnell's assertion is also inconsistent
with Speech Clause principles. It suggests that content-discrimination in favor of religious ideas might be permissible under the
Speech Clause.9 4 And in cases in which both speech and free exercise rights are implicated, a content-based result in favor of religious speakers might be required.9 5 Finally, McConnell's proposition suggests that laws that favor religion over non-religion should
be readily upheld-establishment, equal protection, and speech
principles notwithstanding.
Precedent then is clearly not on McConnell's side. Neither is
text or history. That the text of the First Amendment explicitly
references religion and not other belief systems does not support
the conclusion that religion is the preferred value. Rather, the explicit reference to religion reflects the fact that religious groups
had often been persecuted and therefore needed special protection.
The text, in short, is consistent with protecting religion from discrimination; it does not compel discrimination in favor of religion.
9 See text at notes 73-75.

"1Prince v Massachusetts,321 US 158, 164 (1944).
9 Compare Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 424 (1962) (finding an Establishment Clause
violation in the daily recital of a denominationally neutral prayer in public schools despite
the fact that students were free to remain silent or be excused from the room while the
prayer was being read).
93 Compare Grand Rapids School District v Ball, 473 US 373, 382 (1985); Committee
for Public Education v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 798 (1973); Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602,
612-13 (1971).
94 Compare Texas Monthly, 489 US at 25-26 (White concurring).
95 See text at notes 22-23.
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Nor does history support the supremacy of religion claim. In
another article, McConnell argues that the rejection of the term
"conscience" in an earlier draft of the First Amendment is evidence that the framers rejected the protection of all conscience in
favor of protection for religious conscience only.96 This historical
claim, however, does not refute the contention that the protection
provided by the Free Exercise Clause was limited to direct persecutions of religious exercise and was not intended to provide reli97
gion with special benefit over and above other types of belief.
Moreover, the history and text arguments are weakened by the
fact that the Establishment Clause suggests that the framers did
not see religion as the beneficent force that McConnell assumes.
Instead, the Establishment Clause uniquely singles out government advancement of religion as a matter to be avoided. Because
there is no comparable limitation on other types of belief systems,
the claim that religion is preferred is not persuasive.9 8
The non-establishment point is particularly critical given the
role of religion in politics and society. As noted previously, religion
is a primary force in the development of cultural mores and values.
To suggest that religion receive added vitality in this role by either
directly aiding its dissemination or insulating it from other social
forces wholly distorts the non-establishment principle.
Indeed, although the free exercise exemption helps religion extend its political and social influence, 9 it does not protect the integrity of religion itself. First, the integrity of religion does not
benefit from a system that encourages individuals to characterize
their beliefs in religious terms in order to gain government beneficence or exemption. 100 Religion is not served when it becomes the
tool for fraudulent or specious claims.10 ' Second, and more importantly, the inviolability of religious belief, the concern most pressing to McConnell, is not preserved by constitutional exemptions
that nevertheless require claimants to vindicate their religious beliefs in court. The religious believer still submits to secular author-

' Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1410, 1495 (1990).
97 Hamburger (forthcoming) (cited in note 7).
8 In his response, McConnell argues there is inconsistency in not allowing religion to
be singled out for free exercise purposes while allowing it to be singled out for establishment
purposes. See McConnell, 58 U Chi L Rev at 330 (cited in note 13). He misses the point. If
the Establishment Clause prohibits special advancement of religion, it would be inconsistent
to read the Free Exercise Clause as requiring special advancement.
" See text at notes 76-79.
160 West, 4 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 603-04 (cited in note 6) (citing Mone
v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 774 F2d 570, 571 (2d Cir 1985)).
101 See United States v Kuch, 288 F Supp 439, 443, 445-46 (D DC 1968).
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ity, and a secular authority still rules on the religious claim.1 °2
Third, the claim that religious beliefs somehow need special insulation and greater protection than their secular counterparts demeans religion. It implies that religion cannot survive on its own.
It thus conflicts with the principle of religious voluntarism which
posits "that spiritual and ideological claims [should] seek recogni10 3
tion on the basis of their intrinsic merit.'
Finally, McConnell's claim that religion should be treated as
the product of an externally imposed obligation ignores another
understanding of religion-one that holds that religion, along with
other quests for ultimate Truth, should be treated as a product of
man's freedom rather than his external obligation. 04 Significantly,
it is this latter view that is more consistent with the commitment
05
to freedom expressed in the First Amendment itself.1
In the end what is important about McConnell's assertion of
the constitutional priority of religious obligation is that it identifies
the assumptions necessary to support the free exercise claim for
exemption. Religion must be viewed as a product of theistic obligation rather than individual freedom, and the Constitution must be
viewed as embodying a special commitment to that form of belief.
If both assumptions are accepted, the claim for special religious
exemption from neutral laws becomes plausible. 0 6 The premise
that religion is based on duty to a sovereign God, however, is controversial from a religious standpoint. It ignores non-theistic religious belief and rejects a competing theistic religious concept that
true faith in God is premised upon freedom. The assumption that
the Constitution embodies a special commitment to theistic obligation, in turn, contradicts two essential constitutional themes. Special treatment belies equality; obligation opposes freedom. The
102 Some argue that the strength of religious belief is most fully developed when that
belief opposes secular precepts. Stanley Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion: A Subtle Temptation, 73 Soundings 317, 319, 337 (1989). Compare Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling
(Princeton, 1983).
103 Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment, 81 Harv L Rev 513, 517 (1968).
104 Rather than being antithetical to faith in God, the notion that religion is a product
of freedom is itself profoundly religious. See generally Fyodor Dostoevsky (C. Garnett,
trans), The Brothers Karamazov, "The Grand Inquisitor" 299-309 (Modern Library, 1950)
(In Dostoevsky's work, Jesus is seen as offering freedom to humanity while the church, in
contrast, is seen as offering miracle, mystery, and authority).
o Marshall, 40 Case W Res L Rev at 411 (cited in note 7).
106 To be consistent with these assumptions, however, eligibility for exemption should

be tied to theistic beliefs, and the exemption claim must still overcome the difficulties inherent in exemption analysis noted earlier.
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case in favor of the free exercise exemption, in short, depends upon
ill-advised leaps of faith.

